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FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN LAW
Lyons Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
377 F.Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
From their nineteenth century "thrift club" origins, savings and loan as-
sociations have grown to become the nation's second largest financial inter-
mediary. Within the past three decades, de-urbanization, the emergence of
suburbs as the primary home financing areas, and the corresponding exodus
of savings funds have caused the ability to open branch facilities to become
a primary growth, if not survival, goal for savings and loan associations. In
order to compete for savings funds and new markets, savings and loan asso-
ciations have sought to expand their operations through branch offices. In-
dustry growth through branching has become a significant factor, with the
number of savings and loan branch offices now exceeding the number of
main operating sites.'
While the Federal Home Loan Bank Board may authorize branch opera-
tions for federally-chartered associations, a number of states historically have
prohibited or restricted branching for state-chartered associations. 2 Litigation
has focused on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's authorization of branch-
ing for federal associations in states where local law prohibits or restricts state
association branching. Although Illinois prohibits branching for its state as-
sociations, 3 since 1973 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has granted its
approval for branch offices to Illinois-based federal associations. 4 This note
will analyze Lyons Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board,- a case challenging the permissibility of federal association branch-
ing in Illinois. In this context, federal policy and regulations, state law and
1. At year-end 1973 there were 12,344 savings and loan associations in the United
States. Of the total number of associations, 57.5%, or 7,100, were branch offices, and
42.5% were main operating sites. In 1973, savings and loan associations became the
nation's second largest financial intermediary, with assets in excess of 272.4 billion dol-
lars and over-the-counter assets of 227.3 billion dollars. U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS Asso-
CIATIONS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FAcT BOOK 62, 53 (1974 ed.) [hereinafter cited as FACT
BOOK.]
2. Federal Home Loan Bank Board branching regulations are found at 12 C.F.R.
556.5. For a survey of state savings and loan branching laws, see Harth, Additional
Offices and Facilities of Savings Associations, XL LEGAL BULL. 95, 107, 115-23 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Harth].
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1973).
4. Letter of January 12, 1973, to U.S. Representative Edward R. Madigan from
Carl 0. Kamp, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, found as
Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Lyons Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
5. 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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practice, case precedent, and the impact of branching on industry competi-
tion will be assessed.
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD AND ILLINOIS POLICY
Branching has long been the subject of controversy. Its proponents
argue that branching may provide greater convenience and more accessible
services to the public at lower cost to associations, and that through branching
associations may compete more effectively for their share of the savings mar-
ket." Branching's opponents, on the other hand, maintain that savings and
loan associations are, historically and functionally, neighborhood "grass
roots" organizations peculiarly responsive to unsophisticated savers and com-
munity needs for savings and home-financing services, whose unique char-
acter is lost in expansion and decentralization.
7
The laws of the various states have historically differed rather markedly
as to the permissibility of branching for financial institutions. 8 As to feder-
ally-chartered associations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
has traditionally pursued a policy of "'competitive equality," gearing its ap-
proval for federal association branching to local statutes governing state as-
sociation branching.9 FHLBB regulations are, however, directive rather
than mandatory, and the FHLBB may authorize practices inconsistent with
local statutes when it determines that the "best practices" of state associa-
tions condone practices such as branching. 10
In 1973, only one of the fifty states prohibited savings and loan branch-
ing. Illinois, with the second greatest volume of savings and loan assets in
the nation," forbade branching operations for its state-chartered associations,
and federal savings and loan associations, in conformity with FHLBB regu-
lation, were likewise prohibited from branching.
1 2
The FHLBB aggressively supports savings and loan branching. Its cur-
rent stance was summarized by the director of its Office of Industry Develop-
ment: "Over the past couple of years, the Board has attempted to clear the
6. G. Gilbert and W. Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial Institu-
tions on Competition, Productive Efficiency and Stability, 1973 J. BANK RES. 154-56,
298-300 (two-part article published in Autumn and Winter issues) [hereinafter cited as
Gilbert and Longbrake].
7. Id.
8. Harth, supra note 2, at 107, 115-123.
9. 12 C.F.R. 556.5(b)(1).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970); 12 C.F.R. 556.5(b)(1).
11. Assets of Illinois savings and loan associations in 1973 were 20.97 billion dol-
lars, or 7.7% of the national total. FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 56.
12. See Office of Industry Development, Federal Home Loan Bank Board: Branch
Banking in Illinois: Fact or Fiction?, prepared August, 1972, and contained in Exhibits
to Defendant's Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Lyons Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as OID study].
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path . . . for associations to branch. The new Board has indicated its de-
sire to continue in the same direction.' 1 3  The FHLBB urges associations
to compete aggressively for a share of the savings market and to accelerate
their movement into new market areas. It warns that savings and loan
associations are in competition for savings accounts with other -types of fi-
nancial institutions, and that savings associations can effectively compete
only if they pursue a more customer-oriented branching policy. In sum-
mary, "[i]f associations do not have branch offices, or only one or a few
branch offices, they will be at a competitive disadvantage in the growing
struggle for the savings dollar.'
14
In contrast, Illinois-chartered savings and loan associations are specifi-
cally denied branching privileges "unless and to the. . . extent branch pow-
ers and offices are granted to state banks", nor are Illinois banks permitted
to operate branch offices. 15 Until 1973, the FHLBB similarly prohibited Il-
linois-based federal association branching, in line with its regulations and the
Home Owners Loan Act.'6 The Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) provides,
however, that the Board shall give "'primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of local mutual thrift and home-financinig institutions in -the United
States.' 7 The Act is directive rather than mandatory in nature, in contrast
with the National Banking Act, which specifically requires that national bank
branching be tied to state law.' 8 The FHLBB is vested with broad discre-
13. Carrington, Not Planning to Branch?, FHLBB JOURNAL, September, 1973, at
15.
14. Id. at 19.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16-1/2, § 106
(1968).
16. The Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, § 5a, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970) pro-
vides:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may
invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board
is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide
for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation of . . . Federal
Savings and Loan Associations . . . and to issue charters therefor, giving pri-
mary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-fi-
nancing institutions in the United States.
12 C.F.R. 556.5(b)(1) (1974) sets out the Board's general branching policy:
(1) As a general policy, the Board permits branches and mobile facilities
by Federal savings and loan associations in a particular State if the State law,
or State practice in the absence of statutory prohibition, permits savings and
loan associations, savings banks, or commercial banks of the State to establish
branches in such State or to conduct chain, group or affiliate operations.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970).
18. The branching provisions of the National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1970), are as follows:
(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the
limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks
by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in
which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at
the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question
by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely
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tionary powers to determine what it deems to constitute "best practices"
within a particular state. Thus, when the Board, pursuant to its plenary
authority under the HOLA, determines that conditions within a particular
state justify branching (even when as in Illinois, branching is specifically
prohibited) or broader branching powers (in states with restrictive branch-
ing laws) it may authorize full branching for federally-chartered associa-
tions. Such a "best practices" determination in Illinois recently brought
about FHLBB authorization of full-scale federal branching in the face of the
Illinois Savings and Loan Act's specific prohibition of branching. 19 The
Board's action is being contested in a case pending in the district court for
the Northern District of Illinois.
20
"DE FACTO BRANCHING" IN ILLINOIS
In August, 1972 the Office of Industry Development (OLD) of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board prepared a position paper, "Branch Banking in
Illinois: Fact or Fiction. '21 The study first noted that the Board had ap-
proved federal association branching in three states where group, chain or
affiliate banking was conducted in the face of state statutory prohibitions
(Florida, 1949; Wisconsin, 1965; and West Virginia, 1972). Illinois, it
was noted, was the last state in which federal associations were denied
branching privileges. 22 The study identified twenty-nine separate groups of
banks which, through chain operations, controlled one hundred thirty-nine Il-
linois banks.23 The largest combine, the Heritage Bank group, at the time
of the study controlled one national and ten state banks, and had been
granted permission to organize three new banks. Interlocking directorates
among the primary banking groups, documented in the study, were seen to
by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location im-
posed by the law of the State on State banks.
The Illinois Banking Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 16-1/2, § 106 (1968), provides:
No bank shall establish or maintain more than one banking house, or re-
ceive deposits or pay checks at any other place than such banking house, and
no bank shall establish or maintain in this or any other state of the United
States any branch bank, nor shall it establish or maintain in this State any
branch office or additional office or agency for the purpose of conducting any
of its business.
The Illinois Savings and Loan Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (1973), ties savings
and loan branching policy to the Illinois Banking Act:
No association shall establish branches or offices at which savings or invest-
ments are regularly received or loans approved unless and to the geographical
extent branch powers and offices are granted to state banks under the 'Illinois
Banking Act', as amended, or as it may be amended or supplemented, except
the Commissioner may adopt regulations which provide for the establishment of
a facility as defined by the Commissioner, in the case of a supervisory merger,
or a single facility in the case of a relocation.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (1973).
20. 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
21. OID study, supra note 12.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 4-5.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
be extensive. 24  Further, it was noted that as of June, 1972 one hundred
twenty-eight bank holding companies were registered in Illinois, two of which
maintained at least operational control of seven banks. The operation of
drive-in and pedestrian walk-up facilities allowed by the Illinois Banking
Act was noted as another instance of "de facto" branch banking in the
Board study.2
5
As to savings and loan associations, the Board study noted that fifteen
savings and loan associations in Illinois were controlled by holding compan-
ies. Although only one such holding company controlled more than one as-
sociation,26 the study predicted an increase in such operations.
27  Of
greater concern to the OID were -the provisions of the Illinois Savings and
Loan Act authorizing the Commissioner of Savings and Loan Associations to
adopt regulations for the maintenance of facilities upon the relocation or
merger of associations. While federal associations may also be granted ap-
proval for relocation and/or merger, the authors of the study noted that con-
ditions for approval of such actions were more stringently construed by the
FHLBB than corresponding conditions imposed by the Illinois Commis-
sioner. 28
The Illinois Commissioner is empowered to approve relocation for state
associations when it is established that:
(1) need exists for savings and loan association services in the
community or area of operation of the proposed facility and 'the
proposed facility will satisfy said need; or -that it is in the best
interest of the association that the proposed facility be maintained,
and
(2) that the proposed facility can be maintained without undue
injury to properly conducted existing associations.
29
Thus, under the Illinois Act, state associations may retain their former of-
fice as a facility when relocating their main office, or retain one office as a
facility in -the case of merger.30 Remarks of the then Commissioner, nom-
inally addressed to the problem of red-lining in metropolitan areas, were in-
terpreted as favoring "de facto" branching through liberal application of fa-
cility regulations. 3 ' State laws and regulations, as construed and imple-
24. Id. at 7-8.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Article X, Rules and Regulations of the Illinois Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner.
29. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (1973).
30. Id.
31. In a speech before the Cook County Council Spring Conference, June 6, 1972,
quoted in the OID study, supra note 12, at 9, Commissioner Lanigan, referring to the
effects of regulations allowing state associations to relocate and maintain the former of-
fice as a facility, stated:
They [savings and loan associations] can now satisfy their obligation to the
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mented, were deemed to effectuate the de facto equivalent of branching for
Illinois banks and savings and loan associations. Federal associations were
judged to be at a competitive disadvantage in light of local associations' abil-
ity to move their main offices to new markets or to increase their operations
by merger. The OID study concluded that branching was an accomplished
fact in Illinois, stating:
There is a national policy to permit branchinig of FS&LA's, even
in states where banks are limited in branching powers. This sit-
uation places FS&LA's in Illinois in a position where they are not
able to compete and serve customers as well as FS&LA's do in
other states. As the Board is required to give primary consider-
ation to 'best practices', and not state law under Home Owner's
Loan Act, the presence of branching by FS&LA's in all but one
state, and the healthy growth of associations in such states, indi-
cates that branching. controlled by the criteria of the regulations,
is a 'best practice' for mutual thrift and home-financing institu-
tions.8
2
If Illinois-chartered savings and loan associations engage in "de facto
branching", they do so in a highly restrictive fashion. More than one office
may be maintained only in the case of supervisory merger or relocation.33
Before such actions are approved, an association must establish a need for
savings and loan operations in the community in which it proposes to estab-
lish a facility or relocate; further, it must be shown that such operations may
be maintained without undue injury -to existing associations.34 These provi-
sions are nearly identical to federal branching regulatory criteria. Moreover,
the FHLBB may approve relocation and merger for federal associations,
although its regulations are by comparison more stringently applied.
Federal associations may apply to open one branch office in 1974 in
Illinois; there is no apparent limit to the number of branches that may be
opened after 1974.85 State associations, on the other hand, have the op-
tion of merger or relocation with the maintenance of a facility. As a prac-
,tical matter, either option is a major business upheaval, and probably a sin-
communities of their birth and make a significant social contribution by pro-
viding a meaningful remedy to use against the cancer of urban blight.
At the same time, they can participate in the dynamic growth of the 70's
by bringing their resources and experience to the expanding suburban commun-
ities.
The problem of red-lining, or the discrimination against the making of mortgage loans
in depressed, inner-city areas, has been investigated by the Illinois Legislative Invesigat-
ing Commission. The Commission's report, tentatively titled Red-Lining: Discrimina-
tion in Mortgage Loans, is scheduled for publication in early 1975.
32. OID study, supra note 12, at 14.
33. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 709 (1973).
34. Id.
35. Letter of January 12, 1973 to U.S. Representative Edward R. Madigan from
Carl 0. Kamp, Jr., Acting Chairman of the FHLBB, found as Exhibit 1 to Defendant's
Supplemental Memorandum in 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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gular occurrence. It is difficult to envision a situation in which an associ-
ation might be allowed to relocate its main office or to merge with another
association whenever it seeks to increase its share of the market.
It should be noted that the OID study laid primary emphasis on the pro-
liferation of group, affiliate and chain banking and the activities of bank
holding companies. No comparable activities on the part of savings and
loans were cited; and only one instance of holding company operations
was noted. The vast majority of Illinois associations are of the mutual-asso-
ciation type and are denied the option of proliferation through holding com-
pany acquisitions, which is permitted only to capital stock associations.88 In
short, the cited instances of "de facto branching" which effected the change
in F-LBB policy related far more directly to Illinois bank activities than to
Illinois savings and loan activities.
According to Board policy and case law,37 once -the determination has
been made that federal savings and loan associations will be permitted to
branch in a particular locus, full branching is allowed (provided the usual
requirements of need and lack of undue injury are met), even though state
association branching may be statutorily prohibited, or restricted by geo-
graphical limitations, number of branches, and so forth. Thus, a federal as-
sociation, once branching is authorized, may expand and reach markets pro-
hibited to state associations which are prohibited or restricted as to branch-
ing activities. In certain situations, therefore, federal associations might be
able to wield virtually monopolistic power over new markets.
It is not herein suggested that federal associations should be denied the
opportunity -to expand their operations in the face of "de facto branching
operations by state savings associations. It is submitted, however, that to
liberalize the local interpretation of federal regulations pertaining to reloca-
tion and merger to more nearly conform with prevalent local practices and
regulations, rather than authorizing unrestricted branching, would have
achieved an equitable result more closely approximating competitive equilib-
rium. If, as the OID study concludes, federal associations suffered a com-
petitive disadvantage, under the full branching provisions they may poten-
tially enjoy competitive superiority.
Lyons Savings and Loan Association
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
As a result of the OID study, the FHLBB in January, 1973 reversed its
prior "no branching" policy and began approving branch applications from
federal savings and loan associations located in Illiniois. This action has
36. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 792.1 (1973).
37. E.g., Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 329 Mass. 184, 107 N.E.2d 315 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 884 (1952).
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prompted litigation now pending in the district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. Lyons Savings and Loan Assoication v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Board38 and seven consolidated cases were brought to challenge the
Board's action. Eight state-chartered savings and loan associations sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the FHLBB authorization of de novo
branching by federally chartered Illinois associations. The FHLBB, its indi-
vidual directors, and federal associations whose branch applications had been
approved by the FHLBB were named parties defendant.
The issues in Lyons, rarely litigated in the Seventh Circuit, were as fol-
lows: the authority of the FHLBB to approve branch applications in any
case, and specifically where state law prohibits branching; the constitutional-
ity of permitting federal associations a wider latitude than that available to
state associations and banks; noncompliance by the Board with its own
branching regulations; the Board's procedure in processing branch applica-
tions; and whether the Board's approval of individual branch applications
was arbitrary and capricious.
In one of the first cases arising under the Home Owners Loan Act,
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Wisconsin v. Loomis,3 9 the
Seventh Circuit held that the HOLA was constitutional, supported by both
the fiscal powers and general welfare clauses of the Constituiton. Viewing
the preservation of home ownership and the promotion of a sound system
of home mortgage" 40 a matter of national importance, the court affirmed
the constitutionality of the HOLA and the validity of the transaction of busi-
ness by the federally-chartered association independent of the authoritiy of
the state of Wisconsin. In Fahey v. Mallonee41 the Supreme Court held that
the HOLA did not violate articles 1 and 8 of the Constitution, finding that
delegation of legislative authority in one of the longest-regulated and most
closely supervised of public callings might be more readily permitted than in
the area of "new crimes in uncharted fields."
42
The HOLA is silent as to branching, merely directing the FHLBB to
give "primary consideration to [local] best practices". 43 Several cases have
challenged the Board's authority to approve branching applications. The
courts have unanimously characterized the powers granted by the HOLA
as plenary, evidencing a "clear intent" by Congress that the Board have the
38. 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
39. 97 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1938). The case contains extensive constitutional inter-
pretation.
40. 97 F.2d at 840 (7th Cir. 1938).
41. 332 U.S. 245 (1947). The Court particularly rejected appellee's arguments of
invalid legislative delegation, based on the rationale of Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935), A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See generally cases cited at 91 L. Ed. 203.
42. 332 U.S. at 250 (1947).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1933).
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power to develop rules and regulations governing the conduct of thrift insti-
tutions.
44
North Arlington National Bank v. Kearny Federal Savings and Loan
Association45 is the case most frequently cited as sustaining FHLIBB author-
ity to establish branch associations. There the court, after considering the
pertinent statutes, administrative regulations and congressional action, found
ample support for the authority of the Board to approve federal association
branch offices. Further, the court justified the disparities of federal banking
and federal savings and loan laws regarding branching on policy grounds.
It noted that savings and loan associations, although pursuing some banking
functions, do not do a general banking business. 46 Their primary purpose
is to encourage thrift and provide home financing. Further, the court
deemed the possibility of unfair competition or monopolization by any sin-
gle organization unlikely in view of the requisite statutory showing of com-
munity need for an association and absence of undue injury to existing as-
sociations. The exercise of such business judgment by the FHLBB in pass-
ing on charter and branch applications, the court held, is wholly consonant
with the legislative policy declared in the HOLA.
Courts have uniformly noted congressional intent that the HOLA and
its attendant regulations pre-empt the field of savings and loan law, both as
to state branching prohibition 47 and state branching restrictions. 48  Thus, in
Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Federal Savings and Loan
Association,49 it was held that the FHLBB is "clothed with congressional
sanction" to establish regulations.50 State law restricting branching opera-
tions to an area within fifteen miles of the home office was found to be
in direct conflict with federal regulations, which permitted branching within
one hundred miles of the main office situs. 51 Where state and federal provi-
44. Lyons Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 377 F. Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Bridgeport Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 950 (1963); Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Fed. Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n, 329 Mass. 184, 107 N.E.2d 184 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 884
(1952); North Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearny Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d
564 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); United States v. First Fed. Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Wisc. 1957), modified on other grounds,
248 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957); Central Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Chariton, Iowa v.
FHLBB, 293 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Iowa 1968), af'd, 422 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970); First
Nat'l Bank of McKeesport v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Homestead, 225 F.2d
33 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
45. 187 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951).
46. 187 F.2d at 567.
47. United States v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Wis.
1957), modified on other grounds, 248 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957).
48. Springfield Institution for Savings .v. Worcester Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 329
Mass. 184, 107 N.E.2d 315 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 884 (1952).
49. ld.
50. Id. at 187.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a, c, i) (1970).
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sions were in direct conflict, the Springfield court held, federal regulations
must prevail; federal associations were allowed the geographical latitude in
branching denied to local associations. The court cryptically stated: "If it
be thought that the result reached is not in accord with the most approved
principles of economics, the remedy must lie with Congress."
' 52
Arguments have been similarly propounded where state laws specifi-
cally prohibit branching. Analogies to the National Banking Act, which
specifically ties national bank branching powers to state law, as opposed
to the HOLA's "best practices" directive,5 3 have been repeatedly drawn. The
courts have consistently referred to the continual failure of legislative at-
tempts to conform the HOLA to the National Banking Act provisions, 54 and
have distinguished the functional differences between commercial banks and
thrift institutions."5 As the Lyons court said, "[t]he fact that any particular
state has not adopted for its own institutions what the Board deems to be a
'best practice' cannot limit the Board's authority without undermining the
fundamental purpose of the statute."561
Allegations of deprivation of property without due process of law and
violation of the equal protection clause, grounded on the premise that state
associations would not possess branching rights identical to those of federal
associations, have been consistently rejected in light of the overriding "na-
tional" concern for the promotion of thrift and home-financing institutions.
Allegations of tenth amendment violations have been rejected on the same
grounds.
57
Courts considering questions of administrative law and the propriety of
Board hearing procedures have typically upheld its practices. Thus, it has
been held that the FHLBB is not required to conduct hearings in connection
with its consideration of branch applications. Both Board procedures and
determinations are committed to agency discretion, subject to judicial review
only when arbitrary or capricious. 58 Nor is the Board required to issue find-
ings of fact or law; a "curt explanation" will suffice. 59 Relying on the ple-
nary powers granted by the HOLA, courts have viewed FHLBB application
52. 329 Mass. at 187; 107 N.E.2d at 318.
53. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) with 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
54. E.g., Sen. Rep. No. 1118, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Rep. of Comm. on
Banking and Currency, Sen. Rep. No. 1186, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954); 100 Cong.
Rec. 6895-6911; Sen. Rep. No. 518, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1955).
55. 377 F. Supp. at 18.
56. Id.
57. 377 F. Supp. at 18-20 and cases cited therein; North Arlington Nat'l Bank v.
Kearny Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir., 1951); Central Savings &
Loan Ass'n of Chariton, Iowa v. FHLBB, 293 F. Supp. 617 (S. D. Iowa, 1968).
58. E.g., Bridgeport Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 307 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir.
1962); First Nat'l Bank of McKeesport v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Home-
stead, 225 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
59. E.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U,.S. 138 (1973 ).
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and hearing procedures properly the subject of exclusive FHLBB discre-
tion.60
The Lyons court declined to depart from prior decisions upholding
FHLBB branching practices. In its memorandum opinion of March 27,
1974,61 it granted defendants' motions for summary judgment as to all issues
save the factual determination of the reasonableness of the Board's internal
processing of each subject branch application.
In reaching its decision, the Lyons court found full judicial support for
its position. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Home Owners
Loan Act, emphasizing the plenary, discretionary powers granted the FHLBB
as necessarily including the authority to approve branch applications.6 2 Fur-
ther, the court reasoned, the plenary nature of these powers shows a clear
congressional intent that federal regulations pre-empt the field. 63 Countering
the argument that savings and loan branching should be tied to state law as
is bank branching, the court noted the failure of legislative attempts to add
such restrictions to the HOLA. 64 The court, in short, found that "no exact
parity between state and federal savings and loan associations is either re-
quired or necessarily intended. '65
THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF Lyons
Several cases have involved unsuccessful allegations of unfair competi-
tion or violation of the antitrust laws. 66  Courts presented with this issue
have to date held that Board regulations requiring a showing of community
need for a new association and lack of undue injury to existing associations
adequately safeguard against anticompetitive abuses. 7 Similarly, the Ly-
ons court reasoned that since branch associations may be established only in
areas served inadequately or not at all, no undue competitive advantage
would arise from condoning fuller branching capacity to federal savings and
loan associations. 68
The issue of competition among savings and loan associations with un-
equal branching capabilities has been argued unsuccessfully before several
60. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
61. 377 F. Supp. 11.
62. Id. at 16.
63. 377 F. Supp. at 17, citing Washington Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Balaban,
281 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1973), and People v. Coast Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 98 F.
Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
64. Supra note 54.
65. 377 F. Supp. at 18.
66. North Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearny Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d
564 (3rd Cir. 1951); Central Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chariton, Iowa v. FHLBB, 293
F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Iowa, 1968); United States v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 151
F. Supp. 690, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
67. 377 F. Supp. at 17.
68. Id.
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courts.69 The alleged competitive disadvantage of Illinois-based federal sav-
ings and loan associations was, in fact, the impetus for the actions taken by
the Board. To date, the courts have rejected state associations' allegations
that full-branching federal associations may enjoy a competitive superiority
over state associations where branching is restricted or prohibited, finding
that FHLBB regulations provide adequate protection against undue compe-
tition.70 Viewing the development of antitrust litigation in the related com-
mercial banking industry in connection with growth and concentration indi-
cia for the savings and loan industry, however, it is arguable that colorable
claims of undue competition or antitrust violation may arise in the savings
and loan industry.
Historically, savings and loan associations have developed from local,
neighborhood foundations. Unlike commercial banks, associations have of-
fered only two services, savings deposits and home mortgage financing, and
these functions have -been performed on a highly localized basis. The goal
of the savings and loan industry has been said to be "to intermediate be-
tween savers and borrowers, with an emphasis on individual (as opposed to
corporate) savers and residential mortgage borrowers (as opposed to other
types of credit).71  The prevailing rationale has been that the relatively
small neighborhood association is uniquely able to respond to local savings
and mortgage financing needs. Public convenience and policy would thus
appear to dictate a large number of unit associations to fully serve a com-
munity. Further, a large number of unit associations would arguably stim-
ulate competition.
It has been generally feared that if concentration of financial facilities
is permitted to develop, monopoly practices and an insufficient number of
facilities might ultimately result.7 2 Further, institutions which are able to
concentrate resources, especially in a locale where entry of associations is re-
stricted or prohibited, might diminish the effects of competition and exert
market power. Public policy has traditionally militated against such wield-
69. 377 F. Supp. at 17. E.g., Central Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chariton, Iowa
v. FHLBB, 293 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Iowa 1968), involved an appeal of FHLBB approval
of mobile facilities to be operated in three areas by a federal association. The court
upheld the authority of the Board to approve such operations. Notably, plaintiffs argued
that defendant's operation of mobile facilities would tend to monopolize competition in
violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 et seq. (1970), and the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). The court dismissed this contention in noting that the need for
such facilities had been established (in the Board's sole determination), stating "[ilm-
plicit in the determination of need for the facility is a determination that there is no
unlawful monopoly." Id. at 624.
70. 12 C.F.R. 545.14 requires a finding of community need for the proposed facil-
ity and lack of undue injury to existing associations.
71. See generally Brigham and Pettit, Effects of Structure on Performance in the
Savings and Loan Industry, 3 A STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 971, 996
(I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Brigham and Pettit].
72. Qilbgrt And Longbrake, supra note 6 at 155,
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ing of market power, since institutions possessing such power may drive
prices (e.g., the cost of getting a loan) upward disproportionate to cost,
and discriminate in pricing and allocation of resources to the public detri-
ment.7
8
Yet if firms may realize cost savings from increased size, internal spe-
cialization and centralization, that is, if economies of scale exist in the in-
dustry, 74 a multi-unit system could be more expensive to operate than a
system comprised of a smaller number of larger firms. An institution which
can utilize economies of scale may lower its operating costs and increase its
output of financial services.75 Such a process, however, may produce a sys-
tem comprised of fewer, large institutions, or concentration; the objectives of
market competition and a large number of localized unit associations would
be ultimately frustrated. Further, if an association may recognize signifi-
cant economies of scale by opening branch offices, smaller local institutions
might be economically precluded from reaching new markets.76
Several studies have shown that economies of scale exist in the savings
and loan industry. 77  In addition to the profit impetus of entry into new
markets, these studies conclude, savings and loan associations may realize
cost-saving economies in proportion to increasing size.78 There is also ev-
idence that at least as to some functions, branch offices may be less costly
to operate than unit institutions, although the economies are not significant
and some functions may be performed more cheaply by unit than branch of-
fices. 79 These studies have generally concluded that the optimum competi-
tive atmosphere is one in which both unit and branch offices operate.""
When, however, branching is prohibited or restricted, too few institutions
may be represented in a local market to insure effective price and service
73. Id.
74. Brigham and Pettit, supra note 71, at 1003, summarize the reasons for the ex-
istence of economies of scale as follows: indivisible factors of prduction (i.e., the cost
per unit of output of expensive equipment, staffing and the like is lowered as output in-
creases); purchasing economies (i.e., quantity discounts); specialization of labor; and the
law of large numbers (i.e., large assets tend to stabilize deposit flow and reduce risk,
and to facilitate lower liquidity reserves). For a general discussion of the concept of
economies of scale, see SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE, ch. 4 passim (1970).
75. Gilbert and Longbrake, supra note 6, passim; Brigham and Pettit, supra note
71, passim.
76. Gilbert and Longbrake, supra note 6, at 156.
77. Gilbert and Longbrake, supra note 6; Brigham and Pettit, supra note 71;
Dhrymes and Taubman, An Empirical Analysis of the Savings and Loan Industry, 1 A
STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 67 (I. Friend ed. 1969); Benston, Cost of
Operations and Economies of Scale in Savings and Loan Associations, 2 A STUDY OF
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 677 (I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Benston].
78. Benston, supra note 77, at 7.11-12, 721-61 (tables, appendix, statistical data).
79. Gilbert and Longbrake, supra note 6, at 165-66,
80. Id,
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competition, and offices of large branch organizations may be able to out-
price smaller, single-office firms.81
The evidence would appear to indicate that concentration is occurring
in the savings and loan industry, and that branching is increasing rapidly.
For example, the nation-wide total of savings and loan associations has de-
clined from 6,320 in 1960 to 5,244 in 1973 - an attrition rate of 17 per
cent.82 Notably, this attrition occurred mainly among state-chartered asso-
ciations; 83 the number of federally-chartered associations increased by 72
during this period, while the number of state associations declined by 1,076.84
Average assets per association and per office increased significantly during
the period, as did the corresponding office/association populations.85 Fur-
ther, the number of association mergers increased during the period 1960-
1973, from 23 in 1960 to 124 in 1973, a 43.9 per cent increase. 86 Federal
association mergers increased by 60 per cent; state mergers increased corre-
spondingly by 26.9 per cent.87 Moreover, the number of savings and loan
branch offices surpassed the number of main offices in 1973.88 Thus, it
appears that concentration in the savings and loan industry is occurring at
appreciable rates.
It has been posited that in a situation similar to that giving rise to Lyons,
Illinois "de facto" branching is a far less effective means of market entry
than the full branching permitted to Illinois-based federal associations and
that state associations may consequently be unable to compete pari passu
with federal savings and loan associations. While it is not intimated that
colorable anti-competitive practices exist or will necessarily develop, it is pos-
sible that a pattern of incipient over-concentration could emerge from the Il-
linois situation, both as to branching and merger practices. 89 It is suggested
81. For example, Gilbert and Longbrake, supra note 6, at 164, commented as fol-
lows:
Regulations prohibiting or restricting entry of de novo institutions or de
novo branches of existing institutions may result in too few institutions being
represented in a local market to assure effective price competition. Moreover,
lenient merger policies which lead to concentration of financial resources in
a few firms may also result in noncompetititve pricing in a local market. If
economies of scale exist, larger firms may be able to charge lower prices for
services and offer higher rates on deposits. Accordingly, offices of large
branch organizations may be able to charge lower prices than single office
firms.
82. FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 57.
83. id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 59.
86. Id. at 61.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 62.
89. There is a relative lack of savings and loan antitrust litigation, although sev-
eral commentators have considered the potential for such litigation. See, e.g., The New
nad the Old in Bank Merger Antitrust Principles, XL LEGAL BULL. 288 (1974); Man-
ning, Savings and Loan Operations under Antitrust, 1965 LEGAL BULL. 187; Groebe, Sav-
ings Associations and the Antitrust Laws, 1963 LEGAL BULL. 1. The commercial bank-
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that the branching capabilities of federal associations vis-a-vis -the limited
"de facto" branching practiced by state-chartered associations may facilitate
nearly exclusive entry into and pre-emption of new market areas by federal
associations while state associations are limited to singular relocation or
merger. Aggressively branching federal associations might -thus acquire the
potential to gain market power over state associations. Moreover, state as-
sociations, in order to combat such an effect, might correspondingly seek their
own market shares by greater merger, acquisition and holding company
activities to the further detriment of mul-tiple-association policy and competi-
tive parity. In this light, the words of Chief Justice Warren in Brown Shoe
Co v. United States9" seem particularly apt:
Some of the results of large integrated or chain operations
are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered un-
lawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be ad-
versely affected. It is competition, not competitors which the
[Clayton] Act protects. We cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of small lo-
cally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance
of fragmented industries and markets. If resolved these compet-
ing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give
effect to that decision.
ig industry, for example, is a line of commerce closely similar to the savings and loan
industry. It has been held that the banking industry, although regulated by the Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970), and the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828 (1970), is subject to § 7 Clayton Act sanctions. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1970), applies to such a federally regulated industry to the extent that that indus-
try's regulations fall short of Clayton Act strictures. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968);
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 3,50 (1970). For a concise survey
of the development of antitrust law, see NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A.
(2d ed. 1970). See also Shull and Horvitz, Branch Banking and the Structure of Com-
petition; The Impact of Branch Banking on Bank Performance, NAT'L BANKING REV.,
March, December, 1964 at 117.
Recent banking antitrust litigation has focused on the potential competition doctrine
as defined in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). The poten-
tial competition doctrine contemplates that a firm perceived as a potential entrant into
a concentrated market ("waiting in the wings") exerts a pro-competitive effect on that
market. When such a firm enters a market by merger or foothold acquisition rather
than de novo, such entry has been found to "substantially lessen competition" under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court has indicated that the potential compe-
tition doctrine is applicable to the banking industry when potential entrants are able to
enter de novo. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974).
A recent comment on the banking antitrust cases states that the "changing competitive
picture and vigorous growth and expansion" in the savings and loan industry "increases
the likelihood that [savings and loan] mergers may draw increased attention of the Jus-
tice Department." XL LEGAL BULL. 288, 292 (1974). Cf. FDIC Release PR 54-70,
Board Report 35 (Oct. 5, 1970) which prohibited a proposed merger between two large
Washington savings banks as violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act. Although savings
and loan antitrust litigation is minimal to date, the growth and concentration trends of
the industry, considered by analogy to banking antitrust cases, point the way to future
litigation in the area.
90. 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
Lyons indicates that the Illinois district court will remain consistent
with case law supporting -the plenary and discretionary power of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to determine federal branching policy apart from
the strictures of state law. While the continuation of such a policy may en-
courage industry growth through branching, it neglects the potential for com-
petitive disparity between state and federal associations and may foster con-
centration in the savings and loan industry. Whether such concentration is
pro- or anti-competitive is an open question of public policy interpretation.
If, as has been traditionally suggested, the neighborhood unit association is
most responsive to, and best equipped to deal with, the idiosyncrasies of
savings and home financing for relatively small savings and mortgage ac-
counts, then market concentration may indicate a diminution of financial
services to consumers. If, however, the public need is well served by fewer
and larger associations, and if such a system is operationally more eco-
nomical, concentration within the savings and loan industry need not be
per se invidious. Regulation of savings and loan growth, and maintenance
of competitive parity, especially as to branching and merger policies, is es-
sential to prevent potential over-concentration to the detriment of small,
neighborhood associations.
Branching may undoubtedly promote growth and stimulate competition
within the savings and loan industry. Unequal branching opportunities as
between state and federal associations, however, may prove ruinous to
smaller state savings associations. FHLBB "best practices" determinations
similar to the action taken in Illinois have helped to effect liberalization of
other states' restrictive or prohibitive branching laws. 91 Lyons and the body
of savings and loan case law indicate that the courts will not, at the present
state of industry development, promote competitive equilibrium through ju-
dicial measures. The remedy for state-chartered associations rests with the
Illinois legislature.
SHELLEY B. GARDNER
91. The OLD study, supra note 12, notes legislative reform in West Virginia,
Florida and Wisconsin after FHLBB authorization of full branching for federal associa-
tions.
